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AN ANALYSIS OF WHY CHINA’S GOVERNMENT  
WILL EVENTUALLY REFORM THE HUKOU SYSTEM 
JUSTIN CONDIT 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 If the People’s Republic of China’s (“China”) hukou system is not reformed by the year 
2020, approximately 600 million citizens will be living in Chinese cities facing economic, social, 
and political discrimination.1  China’s hukou system segregates the citizens of China, based on 
their mother’s family lineage, into two classes: citizens with urban hukou and citizens with rural 
hukou.2  In 2010, approximately 261 million citizens had already migrated to urban areas in 
search of better opportunities.3  However, the migrant workers are treated as second class 
citizens as compared to the local urban hukou holders because they are denied basic public 
services, are only eligible for the worst jobs, and are often discriminated against by the local 
hukou holders in the cities.4   
 In November 2013, a report from the 3rd Plenary Session of the Communist Party’s 18th 
Central Committee (“the Third Plenum”), a noteworthy meeting of China’s top leaders in its 
Communist Party, proposed accelerating the gradual reform of the hukou system.5  The plan is to 
                                                 
1 See JASON YOUNG, CHINA'S HUKOU SYSTEM: MARKETS, MIGRANTS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 3 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
2 See, e.g., Kam Wing Chan, The Household Registration System and Migrant Labor in China: Notes on  a 
Debate, Population & Dev. Rev., June 2010, at 357, 357 (describing the two classes of citizenship in China caused 
by the hukou system); see also YOUNG, supra note 1, at 48 (explaining how hukou status is based off the mother’s 
lineage). 
3 See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 1, at 3. 
4 See, e.g., Chan, supra note 2, at 357 (describing how rural hukou holders are denied the same 
opportunities as urban hukou holders).   
5 See China to Accelerate ‘Hukou’ System Reform, GLOBALTIMES.CN (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/825205.shtml#.Uy9bgvldWBL (detailing the proposed hukou reform from the 
Third Plenum in 2013); see also Jane Golley, An End to China’s ‘Apartheid’? , EASTASIAFORUM.ORG (Jan. 14, 
2014), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/01/14/an-end-to-chinas-apartheid/; see also China’s New Reform 
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fully open towns and small cities6 and to relax restrictions on settling in medium-sized cities in 
an orderly manner.7  Additionally, reasonable requirements are to be set for rural residents to 
obtain hukou in large cities, and megacities will continue to be strictly controlled.8  Most 
importantly, the report declared that an “effort should be made to make basic public services 
available for all permanent residents in cities and include all rural residents into the affordable 
housing system and the social security network.”9   
Beginning with the Xia Dynasty in the 21st century BC, China’s government has used a 
form of hukou system as an instrument to advance the government’s self-interests and to control 
the people of China.  Whether it was the Republican government using the hukou system to help 
fend off the communist revolution or the Communist government using the hukou system to help 
implement its planned economy, China’s government has utilized the hukou system to advance 
its self-interests.10  If China’s government is going to implement the recently proposed hukou 
reform, it must achieve more than protecting the human rights of migrant workers and improving 
their standards of living; the proposed hukou reform must also advance the government’s self-
interests.   
There are numerous reasons why the hukou system should be reformed, including the 
protection of human rights and equality. However, this Article focuses on the reasons why the 
hukou system will eventually be reformed, not the reasons why it should be reformed.  China’s 
government will only reform the hukou system if it advances its self-interests.  This Article 
                                                                                                                                                             
Blueprint has Arrived, CHINA REAL TIME (Nov. 15, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/11/15/china-to-
ease-one-child-policy-abolish-labor-camps/ (describing what the 3rd Plenary Session of the Communist Party’s 18th 
Central Committee is); infra Part III. 
6 See Golley, supra note 5 (detailing the plan for hukou reform in small and medium sized cities). 
7 See China to Accelerate ‘Hukou’ System Reform, supra note 5. 
8 See id. 
9 Id. 
10 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 34-35.  
  CONDIT  
3 
 
argues that the Chinese government will eventually reform the hukou system because it will 
advance its self-interests of urbanization, a balanced economy, international legitimacy, and 
domestic social stability.  
Part I demonstrates the historical significance of the hukou system in China and how 
China’s governments utilized the hukou system to advance its self-interests throughout history.  
Part II describes the modern hukou system in China and focuses on how it affects the lives of 
migrant workers.  Part III discusses the most recent proposed reform to the hukou system.  
Finally, Part IV explores how hukou reform will advance the self-interests of the Chinese 
government, specifically urbanization, a balanced economy, international legitimacy, and 
domestic social stability. 
I 
THE HISTORY OF THE HUKOU SYSTEM 
The history of China’s hukou system clearly demonstrates that it has regularly been 
utilized as an instrument to advance the government’s self-interests and to control the people of 
China.11  The Republican government fending off the communist revolution, the Communist 
government establishing sovereignty along China’s borders, and the post-Mao government 
supplying cheap labor for the new market economy are all great examples of the government 
utilizing the hukou system to advance its self-interests.  Why would the recent proposed reform 
of the hukou system be any different?  Understanding the history of the hukou system and 
specifically, why China’s governments used the system in the past, reveals that for the recent 
proposed reform to be achieved, it must advance the Chinese government’s self-interests.       
                                                 
11 See generally YOUNG, supra note 1 (providing a detailed outline of China’s hukou system throughout history). 
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 The development of the pre-modern hukou system,12 the utilization of the hukou system 
during the Republican and Mao eras, and the reform of the hukou system after transforming to a 
market economy in the late 1970s have all greatly influenced modern China and the current 
hukou system.  A form of the hukou system has been a part of China since the Xia Dynasty in the 
21st century BC.13  Since hukou systems have been a feature of political, economic, and social 
life in China for over 4000 years, it has “developed a high degree of historical legitimacy” and is 
part of Chinese culture and tradition.14  Reforming a system that has been a part of the way of 
life in China for so long will be a challenging and monumental feat.  
China’s pre-modern hukou system was an essential part of “the state building process, the 
centralisation of power and authority and restrictions on migration and social mobility.”15  In the 
21st century BC, the Xia Dynasty instituted the first form of the pre-modern hukou system for 
social control and taxation purposes.16  This earliest form of the pre-modern hukou system 
included both a population census and a household registration.17  As early as 770 BC, some 
areas of China began to use the pre-modern hukou system to block internal migration, limiting 
people to their registered living place.18   
During the Qin and Han Dynasties, from 221 BC to 220 AD, the pre-modern hukou 
system developed into more of a legal institution, in which people found violating the system 
were punished.19  If a person was found illegally migrating, in violation of the pre-modern hukou 
                                                 
12 Although it was not called a hukou system in the pre-modern era, the pre-modern Chinese institutions 
were sufficiently similar, consisting of residence registrations and restrictions on mobility.  For the purposes of this 
Article, these similar pre-modern institutions will be referred to as the “pre-modern hukou system.” 
13 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 29. 
14 See id. at 28-29. 
15 Id. at 27. 
16 See id. at 29. 
17 See id.  
18 See id. at 30. 
19 See YOUNG, supra note 1.  
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system, he would bring punishment upon himself and his collective, the organized unit where he 
was registered.20  The Qin Dynasty first began widely imposing harsh punishments for violating 
the pre-modern hukou system, and the Han Dynasty continued developing the system by 
introducing enforcement officials and identification permits.21  A person without a proper 
identification permit was put in prison.22  The pre-modern hukou system, instituted by the Qin 
and Han Dynasties, predominantly remained the system used throughout the remainder of 
China’s pre-modern era.23 
Although imperialism in China fell in 1911, the hukou system continued to be utilized 
“by the Republican Government, warlords, Japanese forces, and the communist insurrection 
alike.”24  The Republican Government used the hukou system to fend off the communists and to 
raise funds to pay for the wars through imposing taxes.25  Similarly, after the Communist Party 
took control, the People’s Republic of China continued to use the hukou system for its self-
interests, despite initially repealing all of the Republic of China’s laws.26  
 During the Mao era, the hukou system was used to manage the planned economy, control 
migration, distribute state resources, and monitor targeted groups of people.27  In the early 1950s, 
at the beginning of China’s communist era, a large number of people from rural areas in China 
migrated to the cities,28 which proved difficult for the newly formed Communist government to 
                                                 
20 See id. at 30-31. 
21 See id. at 31. 
22 See id.  
23 See id. 
24 Id. at 34. 
25 See YOUNG supra note 1. 
26 See id. at 35. 
27 See CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, CHINA’S HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION SYSTEM: SUSTAINED 
REFORM NEEDED TO PROTECT CHINA’S RURAL MIGRANTS (2005) (explaining the hukou system used by China’s 
Communist government from the 1950s to the 1970s); see also YOUNG, supra note 1, at 35. 
28 “China's urban population increased from 10.6 per cent of total population in 1949 to 14.6 percent in 
1956, with a net gain of 34.6 million. Rural migrants accounted for 19.8 million of the total increase.”  Tiejun Cheng 
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manage while trying to implement its command economy and provide subsidies for the urban 
population.29  In response, throughout the 1950s, China’s government instituted strict hukou 
regulations to stop the rural to urban migration, finally culminating in the adoption of the 
People’s Republic of China Hukou Registration Regulation30 in 1958.31  The rationale for the 
Hukou Registration Regulation of 1958 was to maintain social order, be of service to the 
establishment of socialism, and ironically, protect the rights and interests of citizens.32  The 
primary purpose of the regulation was to decrease rural migration to urban areas33 by requiring 
that all internal migration be subject to government approval. 34  As a consequence of the 1958 
regulation, the citizens of China were divided into two very different classes: people with rural 
hukou and people with urban hukou.35  Urban hukou holders were entitled to benefits–including 
employment security, housing, pensions, education, and medical care–while rural hukou holders 
were only entitled to access to farmland and some welfare.36       
 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the government used state planned migrations and 
hukou transfers to advance its self-interests.37  The government commonly used state planned 
border migration to establish land borders and sovereignty in certain areas, such as Tibet and 
                                                                                                                                                             
& Mark Selden, The Origins and Social Consequences of China's Hukou System, THE CHINA QUARTERLY NO. 139, 
Sep. 1994, at 644, 653.  Strong mechanisms, such as the hukou system, were required to prevent a rural exodus.  See 
Chan, supra note 2, at 357. 
29 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 36; see generally Tiejun Cheng & Mark Selden, The Origins and Social 
Consequences of China's Hukou System, THE CHINA QUARTERLY NO. 139, Sep. 1994, at 644 (detailing the origins 
of the hukou system as used by China’s Communist government in the 1950s). 
30 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 40 (providing a detailed summary of 1958 regulation). 
31 See Chan, supra note 2, at 357-58. 
32 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 39. 
33 See id. 
34 See Chan, supra note 2, at 358. 
35 See, e.g., id. at 357. 
36 See Shaohua Zhan, What Determines Migrant Workers’ Life Chances in Contemporary China? Hukou, 
Social Exclusion, and the Market, MODERN CHINA, Feb. 14, 2011, at 244, 252. 
37 “The Mao era was characterized by political and politico-economic migrations sanctioned or imposed by 
the state through transfer of hukou, showing a clear pattern of state use of the hukou system as an instrument of 
political and command economy imperatives.”  YOUNG, supra note 1, at 44-45.   
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Inner Mongolia.38  For example, the government used a planned migration to the northern 
frontiers in order to secure the Sino-Soviet border.39  Additionally, the government also used 
state planned migrations for economic purposes.  Highly skilled and educated workers were sent 
to places that needed their skill set, college students were assigned to places to work after 
graduation, and laborers were sent to areas in need of factory workers for temporary periods of 
time.40  Furthermore, during the Mao era, the government used the hukou system to exile and 
punish urban hukou holders by changing their registration to a rural area.41 
 In 1978, after the death of Mao Zedong, China’s government began economic reforms to 
transform its command economy into more of an open market economy.42  Since the new market 
economy needed low skilled laborers to grow,43 the government began to incrementally relax the 
strictly enforced hukou system to allow some rural hukou holders to migrate to the cities.44  The 
Chinese government needed cheap labor for its new labor intensive, export oriented growth 
strategy,45 so it targeted specific areas in China to dictate the migration, based on the demand for 
workers.46  Additionally, the new market economy led to the abandonment of the rationing 
system, eventually allowing rural hukou holders the ability to migrate without formal registration 
and survive without relying on state subsidies.47  The reforms of the residence restrictions and 
the new market economy allowed rural hukou holders to freely migrate; however, rural hukou 
                                                 
38 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 45. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. at 46. 
42 See BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY 85 (The MIT Press, 2007). 
43 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 27. 
44 See Chan, supra note 2, at 358-359 (describing the relaxation of the strict hukou regulations restricting 
during China’s transformation to a more market economy).  
45 See id. at 357-58. 
46 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 15. 
47 Until the emergence of the market economy, a migrant worker without a local urban hukou could not 
purchase food or find a place to live in the cities.  The new market economy enabled rural workers to migrate to the 
cities in search of employment opportunities because they now had access to urban goods and services.  See Zhan, 
supra note 36, at 253-53; see also CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, supra note 27, at 3.  
  CONDIT  
8 
 
holders who migrated were still not able to receive the public services that urban hukou holders 
were afforded.48  Since the relaxation of the strict limitations on the ability to migrate, reform 
efforts have focused on treating the migrant workers equally compared to the local urban hukou 
holders.  Although the division between the rights of urban and rural hukou holders has been 
reduced since the Mao era,49 the differences that remain still significantly affect the opportunities 
and quality of life of the migrant workers under the current hukou system.50  
II 
THE MODERN HUKOU SYSTEM 
 China’s hukou system is a household registration system which classifies citizens both by 
location of permanent residence and status as either agricultural or non-agricultural residents.51  
Chinese citizens’ hukou status and hukou location are determined through their mother’s family 
lineage.52  Under this system, the people of China are divided into two vastly different classes of 
citizenship: citizens with urban hukou and citizens with rural hukou.53  Approximately 700 to 
800 million rural hukou holders are treated as second class citizens compared to urban hukou 
holders.54  Because of the great disparity between rural and urban China, hundreds of millions of 
rural migrant workers have migrated to cities in hopes of better opportunities.55  In 2010, there 
                                                 
48 See CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, supra note 27, at 3. 
49 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 42 (comparing the rights of urban and rural hukou holder during the Mao 
era). 
50 See id. at 48-50. 
51 See CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, supra note 27, at 2. 
52 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 48. 
53 See, e.g., Chan, supra note 2, at 357; see also, e.g., CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, FREEDOM OF 
RESIDENCE AND MOVEMENT  (2010), available at http://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2010-annual-
report#Freedom of Residence and Movement [hereinafter FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND MOVEMENT ]. 
54 See Chan, supra note 2, at 357. 
55 See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 1, at 48. 
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were 261 million non-hukou workers56 in urban areas of China, and it is predicted that there will 
be 300 to 400 million more within the next decade.57  Although approximately 261 million 
migrant workers are now residents in the cities, they are still treated as second class citizens 
compared to the local urban hukou holders because they face “de facto discrimination . . . in the 
fields of employment, social security, health service, and education.”58 
Migrant workers are denied access to the public goods and services that are afforded to 
the local urban hukou holders because of their non-local hukou status.59  Most of them do not 
receive health care insurance, pension or retirement benefits, unemployment compensation, 
minimum living support, housing benefits, and publicly funded education to urban schools for 
their children.60  The children of the migrant workers are often unable to attend the local public 
schools in the cities where their parents work.61 China’s law and regulations actually call for 
equal treatment of children; 62 however, in practice, millions of migrant children are still 
excluded from attending urban public schools.63  Additionally, regulations allow charging 
additional education fees for migrant children because of their hukou status.64  Migrant workers 
are left with three options: (1) pay for their children to attend urban private schools, (2) pay an 
expensive additional fee to gain access to urban public schools, or (3) send their children back to 
                                                 
56 In 2003, approximately eighty percent of China’s floating population was agricultural hukou or rural 
hukou holders. See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 50.  The vast majority of the non-local hukou population in urban China 
is comprised of rural migrant workers.   
57 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 3 (predicting migration in China for the next decade). 
58 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant on its 34th Sess., at 3, Apr. 25-May13, 2005, 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.107 (May 13, 2005). 
59 See CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, supra note 27, at 7. 
60 See Zhan, supra note 36, at 255; see also YOUNG, supra note 1, at 58-60; see also FREEDOM OF 
RESIDENCE AND MOVEMENT , supra note 53. 
61 See FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND MOVEMENT , supra note 53. 
62 “A 2003 State Council directive instructed local governments to make efforts toward providing education 
for migrant children.”  CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, supra note 27, at 7. 
63 See CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, supra note 27, at 1. 
64 See id. at 8. 
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live with relatives65 and attend a rural school.66  The urban private schools, commonly referred to 
as migrant schools, are relatively affordable for migrant workers, but they are substandard and 
often unlicensed.  These migrant schools “typically have poor teaching facilities, undeveloped 
curricula, insufficient funding, and less qualified teachers.”67  Meanwhile, to gain access to the 
better urban public schools, migrant workers are required to pay a significant additional fee,68 
usually several thousand yuan per year.69  Most migrant workers cannot afford to pay the 
additional fee, and even if they could, migrant children are often not treated equally when 
attending urban public schools.70  Furthermore, if migrant children want to attend high school or 
take the entrance exam for college, they must return to their hukou locations.71       
 In addition to not receiving basic public goods and services, most rural migrant workers 
are only able to get the worst jobs in the cities,72 which “allow a bare minimum standard of 
                                                 
65 Approximately sixty one million Chinese children, one in every five, have not seen one or both of their 
parents for at least three months because their migrant parents must leave them behind to find work in t he cities.  
Many of the left-behind children are left with the responsibilities of running a household, raising younger siblings, 
and caring for aging grandparents.  Unfortunately, the left-behind children often suffer problems, such as anxiety, 
depression, and sometimes even death.  In 2012, five left-behind boys died from carbon-monoxide poisoning when 
they lit a fire in a dumpster, attempting to shelter from the cold.  See Andrew Browne, Left-Behind Children of 
China’s Migrant Workers Bear Grown-Up Burdens, CHINA REAL TIME (Jan.17,2014), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304173704579260900849637692 (an eye -opening portrayal 
of children left-behind in China because their parents are migrant workers).  
66 See FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND MOVEMENT , supra note 53; see also YOUNG, supra note 1, at 59-60 
(explaining the options that migrant workers have to educate their children). 
67 THE WORLD BANK & DEV. RESEARCH CTR. OF THE STATE COUNCIL, CHINA, URBAN CHINA: TOWARD 
EFFICIENT , INCLUSIVE, AND SUSTAINABLE URBANIZATION 18 (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter THE WORLD BANK] 
(describing the condition of migrant schools in china). 
68 In Beijing, rural migrant workers must pay an additional fee of 12,000 yuan per year in order for one 
child to attend urban public schools.  See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 59-60. 
69 See CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, supra note 27, at 8. 
70 In some urban public schools, the migrant children are completely segregated from the other children and 
have separate teachers and textbooks.  See FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND MOVEMENT, supra note 53. 
71 See FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND MOVEMENT , supra note 53; Depending on the location children take 
the college entrance exam, different scores are required to be accepted into the best colleges.  A rural hukou holder 
must score much higher on the exam than a local urban hukou holder to be accepted at the best colleges in the cities. 
See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 60. 
72 Despite only being eligible for the worst jobs in the cities, most migrant workers can still earn far more in 
the cities than at home.  See id. at 51. 
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living.”73  In many of the urban areas, there are local decrees that actually limit migrant workers 
to obtaining jobs only in the low-end, so called “3-D,” category.  Jobs in the so called “3-D” 
category are dangerous, dirty, and demeaning.74  Additionally, migrant workers are easily 
exploitable,75 and it is not uncommon for their working rights to be infringed.76  China’s migrant 
workers are owed billions in delayed salaries from employers, which in many cases they will 
never receive.77  For example, in 2004, fifteen migrant workers were denied rightful wages from 
their employer, a Jiangsu labor company.78  After the fifteen migrant workers finished the 
construction job they were contracted to complete, their boss refused to pay them for their work 
and disappeared.79  With the help of the Beijing Legal Aid Office for Migrant Workers80 
(“BLAOMW”) and its founder Tong Lihua,81 the fifteen migrant workers were able to receive 
                                                 
73 Chan, supra note 2, at 359 (describing the types of jobs that are usually available for migrant workers in 
the Chinese cities). 
74 See id. 
75 See id. 
76 Some examples of infringements on the working rights of migrant workers are the “denial of labour 
contracts; forced overtime; denial of holidays; the use of fines by managers; unpaid wages; financial penalties and 
the obstruction of the rights to leave employment; and grossly inadequate housing arrangements for workers.”  
YOUNG, supra note 1, at 59. 
77 See Tony Lihua - Fighting for the Rights of the Vulnerable, CRIENGLISH.COM (Mar. 2, 2007, 4:04 PM), 
http://english.cri.cn/4406/2007/04/29/47@221807.htm (providing a short biography of Tony Lihua).   
78 See Fifteen Migrant Workers Denied Rightful Wages, BEIJING LEGAL AID OFFICE FOR MIGRANT 
WORKERS (2009), https://sites.google.com/a/chinapilaw.org/blaomw/fifteen-migrant-workers-denied-rightful-wages 
(describing one of the Beijing Legal Aid Office for Migrant Workers leading cases concerning the rights of fifteen 
migrant workers). 
79 See id. 
80 The Beijing Legal Aid Office for Migrant Workers  (“BLAOMW”) is a non-profit organization that 
provides full-time and professional legal aid to Chinese migrant workers.  Since 2005, the BLAOMW has provided 
legal services for more than 95,000 migrant workers and has represented over 5600 migrant workers in court.  As of 
March 2009, it has successfully received awards of over thirty four million yuan for migrant workers.  See About Us, 
BEIJING LEGAL AID OFFICE FOR MIGRANT WORKERS (2009), https://sites.google.com/a/chinapilaw.org/blaomw/ 
about-us.   
81 Tong Lihua, the 2012 International Bar Association Pro Bono Award winner, was one of the first 
professional public interest lawyers in China and founded the Beijing Children’s Rights Legal Aid and Research 
Centre in 1999 and the Beijing Legal Aid Office for Migrant Workers in 2005.  He has devoted his legal career to 
helping the children and migrant workers of China through providing free legal services.  See International Bar 
Association, Tony Lihua 2012 IBA Pro Bono Award Winner, IBANET .ORG (Mar. 10, 2012), 
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=ff0446c9f-b3dd-4698-a4c7-8fee975e22e7 (honoring the 
selfless and inspiring legal career of Tony Lihua).  
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favorable judgments against their employer in court.82  Despite the incredible work of the 
BLAOMW, many of China’s migrant workers are exploited by their employers and lack access 
to legal aid.83  Migrant workers are only eligible for the low-end jobs in the cities and in addition, 
are often exploited by their employers.   
The migrant workers also face discrimination from the local urban hukou holders.  Since 
they are not equal under the laws of China, the local urban hukou holders often look down upon 
and sometimes exploit the migrant workers.84  A rural migrant worker is discriminated against 
for being a waidiren, a non-local resident, and for being a nongmin, a peasant, or a xiangxiaren, a 
rural person.85  Even after thirty years of constant migration, many of the migrant workers still 
face the brunt of stereotyping and discrimination because they are poor and less educated.86  
During an interview in 2005, Li Min, a migrant worker in Beijing, proclaimed, “People from 
Beijing think they’re the real locals, so no matter what, they’re superior to you.  They never think 
about what class they belong to; they only have one way of seeing things: I’m a Beijing local and 
I’m better than you.”87  In a 1996 survey,88 sixty three percent of migrant workers experienced 
discrimination from local urban residents.89  “[P]rovinciality and rural roots can be an 
insurmountable barrier to acceptance and equal treatment in the cities by local urbanites."90       
                                                 
82 See Fifteen Migrant Workers Denied Rightful Wages, supra note 78.  
83 See Tony Lihua - Fighting for the Rights of the Vulnerable, supra note 77. 
84 See Zhan, supra note 36, at 264; see also YOUNG, supra note 1, at 58. 
85 See Zhan, supra note 36, at 261 (describing the discriminatory language used to refer to migrant 
workers). 
86 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 58. 
87 Zhan, supra note 36, at 264. 
88 The survey of migrant workers was conducted in four large cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, and Wuhan.  See Zhan, supra note 36, at 260. 
89 See id. 
90 YOUNG, supra note 1, at 58. 
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 The story of Bai Lin, a nineteen year old girl with a rural hukou, portrays the daunting 
reality of life for many of the approximate 261 million migrant workers in China.91  Bai Lin grew 
up in a dirt-floored hovel in Two Dragons, a small village in central China.92  Her family has 
struggled to survive as farmers in Two Dragons for the last eight generations.93  At fifteen years 
old, Bai’s father told her that she must leave home to search for work in the city because their 
family was too poor to survive.94  Bai Lins’s father was forced to take his fifteen year old 
daughter to the bus station and send her to Changshu, a city of a million people.95  Four years 
later, Bai Lin is still working as a factory drone at Changshu Medical Instrument, a factory that 
produces medical supplies.96  Bai Lin works twelve hours a day, seven days a week, cutting and 
stacking pieces of rubber tubes that eventually become IV drips for hospitals in Switzerland and 
France.97  Each day, Bai Lin essentially goes straight from work to the factory dormitory, “a 
squalid line of concrete rooms that look like connected sheds.”98  The only time she leaves the 
factory compound is when she returns home for the Chinese New Year holiday.99  Before leaving 
for the holiday, Bai Lin receives her entire yearly salary in a one lump sum payment of $500, 
which she gives entirely to her family.100  Bai Lin earns approximately $1.50 a day or around 12 
cents an hour.  To make matters worse, she is trapped into working for the entire year because if 
                                                 
91 See Michael A. Lev, Part 2 of 3: The Factory Nuns of Urban China , CHICAGOTRIBUNE.COM (Dec. 27, 
2004), http://www.chicagotribune.com/chi-chinapart2-story,0,1439341.story [hereinafter Part 2 of 3: The Factory 
Nuns of Urban China] (portraying Bai Lin’s story of migrating from rural to urban China). 
92 See Michael A. Lev, Part 1 of 3: Migration of a Nation, CHICAGOTRIBUNE.COM (Dec. 26, 2004), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/chi-0412260374dec26,0,5421512.story [hereinafter Part 1 of 3: Migration of a 
Nation] (describing the Bai family from Two Dragons, China). 
93 See id. 
94 See Part 2 of 3: The Factory Nuns of Urban China, supra note 91.  
95 See id. 
96 See id. 
97 See id. 
98 Id. 
99 See id.  
100 See id. 
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she leaves before the pay-day, she will likely never receive any wages for her work.101  Every 
year, after the Chinese New Year holiday, Bai Lin desires to stay home, but she knows that she 
must return to the city to help support her family.102  This is the life of a migrant worker in 
China. 
III 
THE RECENT PROPOSED REFORM OF THE HUKOU SYSTEM 
 Hukou reform has been a polarizing topic of conversation amongst the leaders of China’s 
government, the media, and academics.103  In December 2009, China’s Central Economic Work 
Conference suggested initiatives to reform the hukou system in small and medium sized cities as 
a way to increase domestic consumption.104  Increasing consumption in China will help 
rebalance its increasingly instable economy.105  Shortly after the well-publicized Central 
Economic Work Conference, then Premier Wen Jiabao announced “that China will steadily 
advance the reform of its decades-long household registration system in order to ensure migrant 
workers have the same rights as city dwellers.”106  Additionally, in January 2010, the Chinese 
Communist Party’s No. 1 Central Committee Document also proposed hukou reform, similar to 
the initiative that was initially suggested by the Central Economic Work Conference.107  The 
Central Committee Document proposed that “rural migrant workers should be allowed to settle 
                                                 
101 See id. 
102 See id.  
103 See, e.g., Population Council, A Call for Reform of China’s Household Registration System, 36 No. 2, 
POPULATION AND DEV. REV., 405, 405 (2010).  
104 See Sherry Tao Kong, China’s Migrant Problem: The Need for Hukou Reform, EASTASIAFORUM.ORG 
(Jan. 29, 2010, 10:00 PM), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/01/29/chinas -migrant-problem-the-need-for-hukou-
reform/; see also Chan, supra note 2, at 361-62. 
105 Infra Part IV: Rebalance the Economy. 
106 Ran Tao, Achieving Real Progress in China’s Hukou Reform, EASTASIAFORUM.ORG (Feb. 8, 2010), 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/02/08/achieving-real-progress-in-chinas-hukou-reform/. 
107 See Chan, supra note 2, at 362; see also Tao, supra note 106.  
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permanently in small and medium sized cities and enjoy the same public facilities and services as 
those with local urban hukou.”108 
 Although China’s government was comfortable discussing hukou reform in 2010, it was 
not comfortable with the media demanding hukou reform.109  On March 1, 2010, the day before 
China’s National People’s Congress’s annual meeting, an identical article appealing “to the 
authorities to accelerate hukou reform and ultimately to abolish the system” appeared in thirteen 
big-city newspapers from eleven different provinces.110  The article urged for the government “to 
devise a clear timetable for nationwide hukou reform” and that “the rigid hukou system should be 
gradually replaced by a population information registration system, and eventually be 
eliminated.”111  Furthermore, the article justified the appeal for abolishing the hukou system by 
declaring that it breeds corruption and violates human rights and personal freedom of China’s 
constitution.112  The moving appeal for reform of the hukou system concluded by profoundly 
encouraging: 
We hope that our millions and millions of countrymen, whether from the north or south, 
[whether they] live in the city or countryside, will all have the same employment 
opportunities, health care, pension, education, and migration rights.  We hope the rigid 
hukou system will end with our generation, and that the next generation will enjoy 
genuine freedom, democracy, and equality—the sacred rights enshrined in the 
Constitution!113  
                                                 
108 Chan, supra note 2, at 362. 
109 See Population Council, supra note 103, at 405; see also Chan, supra note 2, at 362. 
110 Population Council, supra note 103, at 405; see also Kam Wing Chan, Making Real Hukou Reform in 
China,EASTASIAFORUM.ORG (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/03/making-real-hukou-reform-
in-china/#more-10361 [hereinafter Making Real Hukou Reform in China].  
111 Population Council, supra note 103, at 406. 
112 See id.  
113 Id. at 407. 
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In response, China’s government quickly censored the article by removing it from websites and 
internet portals within a few hours, and Zhang Hong, the main drafter of the article and deputy 
editor of the Economic Observer, was ousted from his employment position.114 
 On June 26, 2013, in a report on urbanization, China’s National Development and 
Reform Commission announced that “the government should gradually tear down household 
registration obstacles to facilitate the orderly migration of people from rural to urban areas.”115  
Additionally, a report of the Third Plenum reaffirmed China’s commitment to accelerating the 
gradual reform of the hukou system by 2020, as part of its urbanization strategy.116  The report 
categorized cities as either towns and small cities, medium-sized cities, large cities, or 
megacities.117  It stated that the plan is to fully open towns and small cities118 and to relax 
restrictions on settling in medium-sized cities in an orderly manner.119  The report is much more 
conservative with regards to large cities and megacities.  Reasonable requirements are to be set 
for rural residents to obtain hukou in large cities, and megacities will continue to be strictly 
controlled.120  Most importantly, the report declared that an “effort should be made to make basic 
public services available for all permanent residents in cities and include all rural residents into 
the affordable housing system and the social security network.”121  The goal is to gradually 
extend these services through both local government and central government funding.122   
                                                 
114 See id. at 405. 
115 Dexter Roberts, China Moves on Reforming Hukou? , BUSINESSWEEK.COM (June 28, 2013), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-06-28/china-moves-on-reforming-hukou. 
116 See, e.g., China to Accelerate ‘Hukou’ System Reform, supra note 5.  
117 See, e.g., Golley, supra note 5.  
118 See id. 
119 See China to Accelerate ‘Hukou’ System Reform, supra note 5. 
120 See id. 
121 Id. 
122 See Dinny McMahon, Beijing Moves to Break Down the Rural-Urban Divide, CHINA REAL TIME (Nov. 
15, 2013, 11:53 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/11/15/beijing-moves-to-break-down-the-rural-urban-
divide/. 
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Recently, the Ministry of Public Security and 11 other ministries and commissions 
drafted guidelines for the hukou reform, which would aim to have a new hukou system 
established by 2020.123  If the guidelines for reform are achieved, a person’s hukou status will be 
determined by his place of residence and employment, rather than the birthplace of his mother’s 
lineage.124  Additionally, Huang Ming, the vice-minister of public security, explained that “the 
new hukou system will gradually extend pension, education and, health care services to qualified 
residents, both urban and rural.”125 
IV 
WHY CHINA’S GOVERNMENT WILL EVENTUALLY REFORM THE HUKOU SYSTEM 
Despite the encouraging proposed reform, there is no guarantee that China’s government 
will follow through with reforming the hukou system.  Numerous reasons exist why the hukou 
system should be reformed, such as the human rights and equality of migrant workers; however, 
hukou reform will only occur if it advances the Chinese government’s self-interests.  China’s 
government will eventually reform the hukou system because it will advance its self-interests of 
urbanization, a balanced economy, international legitimacy, and domestic social stability. 
URBANIZATION 
For the past three decades, China has experienced exceptional economic growth,126 in 
part, because the “rapid economic development was facilitated by urbanization. ”127  During 
                                                 
123 See An Baijie, Hukou Reforms Target 2020: Official, XINUANET .COM (Dec. 18, 2013, 8:41 AM), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/18/c_132976523.htm.   
124 See Baijie, supra note 123; see also Golley, supra note 5.  
125 Baijie, supra note 123. 
126 China has averaged growth of ten percent a year over the past three decades.  See THE WORLD BANK, 
supra note 67, at xiii.  
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China’s period of rapid economic growth, from 1978 to 2012, the urban population increased 
from twenty percent to fifty two percent of the total population.128  By 2030, China’s urban 
population is expected to increase to seventy percent of the total population, some one billion 
people.129  Although China’s urbanization in absolute numbers is massive, “the increase in its 
urbanization rate has not been exceptional by international comparison.”130  Barriers to 
migration, such as the hukou system, keep China’s urbanization rate too low and consequently, 
underutilize productivity and exacerbate the urban-rural inequality gap.131     
Urbanization is vital for a developing country, such as China, because it increases 
productivity and promotes innovation.132  This explains why future urbanization is exceptionally 
important to the Chinese government.  Productivity and innovation increase because urbanization 
provides agglomeration effects, including more efficient labor markets, lower transaction costs, 
and knowledge spill-over between industries.133  Even smaller cities will experience 
agglomeration effects from urbanization, as long as there is both “sufficient specialization and 
transport linkages to larger urban areas.”134    
China’s future urbanization is one of the government’s top priorities,135 as indicated by 
Premier Li Keqiang when he “promoted urbanization as both the next driver of economic growth 
and a tool for addressing the gaping divide in income and quality of life between rural Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                             
127 Urbanization provided “a supportive environment for growth with abundant labor, cheap land, and good 
infrastructure.”  Id. at 3. 
128 See id. at 5. 
129 See id. at 3. 
130 Id. at 5 (China’s urbanization rate has been lower than the urbanization rates of Japan and the Repu blic 
of Korea at similar stages of development). 
131 See id. at xiii. 
132 See id. at 8. 
133 See NAUGHTON, supra note 42, at 126; see also YASHENG HUANG, URBANIZATION, HUKOU SYSTEM AND 
GOVERNMENT LAND OWNERSHIP: EFFECTS ON RURAL MIGRANT WORKERS AND RURAL AND URBAN HUKOU 
RESIDENTS 18 (OECD Development Center, 2010); see also THE WORLD BANK, supra note 67, at 7. 
134 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 67, at 7. 
135 See id. at vii. 
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and urbanites.”136  China’s proposed gradual reform of the hukou system is a part of its greater 
urbanization strategy to encourage more people to migrate to cities where they can earn and 
spend more money.137  Recently, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang also promoted that, “China will 
wage war against poverty with a stronger resolve.”138  In 2012, China’s own officials estimated 
that 98.99 million139 rural poor are living below the national poverty line or $1.8 a day.140  
China’s economy disproportionately benefits its citizens living in urban areas, while citizens in 
rural areas suffer, creating a substantial urban-rural divide.141  China plans to fight this “war on 
poverty” through urbanization, transferring more of its rural population to urban population.142  
The urbanization plan is to increase the income of the rural migrants, narrowing China’s 
unusually large urban-rural income gap.143  Migrant workers’ wages are rising rapidly in China, 
and many rural workers are able to earn higher incomes if they decide to migrate.144  Increasing 
the mobility of workers in China by reforming the hukou system will increase their wages.145  
Additionally, an increase in migration will reduce the labor surplus in the rural areas of China, 
increasing rural wages compared to urban wages.146  Hukou reform will increase the mobility of 
                                                 
136 McMahon, supra note 122. 
137 See, e.g., China to Accelerate ‘Hukou’ System Reform, supra note 5; see also, e.g., Golley, supra note 5.  
138 Shannon Tiezzi, China’s ‘War Against Poverty’, THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 29, 2014), 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/chinas-war-against-poverty/. 
139 The World Bank estimates that China has about 128 million people living below the national poverty 
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140 See id. 
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143 See HUANG, supra note 133, at 8. 
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migrant workers in China and reduce urban-rural inequality by increasing both the wages of 
migrant workers and rural workers.147  
  China’s urbanization strategy is to promote urbanization to less populated towns and 
small cities.148  “China’s urbanization process is a result of a large increase of the number of 
cities rather than a result of increasing the size of existing cities.”149  China’s urban population 
continues to grow, however the population of Chinese cities has remained constant over time.150  
This type of urbanization attempts to make it more attractive for migrant workers to move to 
low-density population or developing urban areas, rather than overcrowding the large cities and 
metropolises.151  China’s government “effectively guides rural to urban migration to targeted 
areas”152 by reforming the hukou system in those specific areas, making it less restrictive.153 
  Reforming the hukou system will increase urbanization and migration in China.  Rural 
hukou holders in China decide to migrate to the cities in search of better opportunities.154  The 
decision to migrate is driven by the income differential between rural and urban China because 
migrants are searching for higher income.155  Rural hukou holders are more likely to migrate to 
cities when there is a large gap between the opportunities existing in rural and urban China.  
China has an unusually large urban-rural inequality gap.156  In 2005, the per capita income of the 
                                                 
147 “Evidence from Korea also shows that free rural-urban migration reduced inequality.  By 1994, three 
decades into reform, Korea’s urban-rural wage gap had disappeared entirely—indicating that workers had migrated 
to their optimal locations.”  Id. at 16-17. 
148 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 61. 
149 HUANG, supra note 133, at 13. 
150 See id. 
151 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 61. 
152 Id. at 62. 
153 See id. at 61. 
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155 See id. 
156 In 2001, China’s Gini coefficient, a summary measure of income d istribution, increased to 0.447, 
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urban resident was over three times higher than that of a rural resident.157  Rural migrant workers 
significantly improve their income from moving to urban areas in China.158  A survey of rural 
migrant workers in urban areas of Guangdong159 showed that their average household income in 
the cities was 31,195 yuan in 2008, while the average household income in their hukou location 
was only 8277 yuan.160  The 2008 survey determined that, on average, rural migrant workers 
increased their household income 22,918 yuan per year by migrating to the cities in Guangdong 
province.161  There is a considerable amount of economic motivation for rural hukou holders to 
migrate to the cities, and as a result, urbanization will continue in China.162  However, despite the 
economic motivation to migrate, China “is still less urbanized than expected at its level of 
income” because of administrative barriers of mobility, such as the hukou system.163  Access to 
the same public goods and services as the local urban hukou holders, will provide additional 
motivation for rural hukou holders to migrate.  Additionally, since the proposed reform is 
gradual, it will allow China’s government to continue to guide the migration to targeted areas, 
such as towns and small cities.   
Hukou reform will advance the Chinese government’s self-interest to accelerate 
urbanization because it will reduce barriers of mobility and provide more motivation to migrate.  
Accelerating urbanization will increase productivity and promote innovation because of 
agglomeration effects.  Every 1% more of rural to urban migration, would yield a projected 1.2% 
                                                 
157 See id. at 133 (not accounting for the cost of living in the cities and rural areas but still a significant 
difference). 
158 See HUANG, supra note 133, at 21. 
159 The survey was conducted on 1500 rural migrant workers in five cities in Guangdong province, 
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more gross domestic product (“GDP”).164  Additionally, urbanization will narrow the urban-rural 
inequality gap.  Migrant workers will earn higher incomes in the cities, and rural workers will 
earn higher incomes when the increase in migration reduces the labor surplus in rural areas.  
Hukou reform will advance the Chinese government’s self-interest in increasing urbanization.             
REBALANCE THE ECONOMY 
 Rebalancing the economy by increasing the consumption share of GDP is a great concern 
of the Chinese government.  At a press conference following the annual meeting of the National 
People’s Conference in March 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao declared, “China’s economic growth is 
unsteady, imbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.”165  Then, in 2011, Premier Wen Jiabao 
again voiced his concerns about the need to rebalance the economy and increase consumption 
when he stated, “If businesses go bankrupt, workers become unemployed and rural migrants go 
home, then what do we have to expand domestic consumption, where will increased 
consumption come from?”166  Additionally, on July 1, 2011, similar concerns were expressed by 
Hu Jintao during his address on the 90th anniversary of the founding of China’s Communist 
Party.  Although China’s economy continues to experience exceptional growth,167 the economy 
also continues to become increasingly imbalanced.168  In order to ensure that China’s economic 
                                                 
164 See id. 
165 NICHOLAS R. LARDY, SUSTAINING CHINA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
44 (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2012). 
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growth remains sustainable in the long term, China must correct the imbalance by increasing 
consumption.169 
 The three basic components of GDP are consumption, investment, and net exports of 
goods and services.170  China’s investment and exports have continued to grow while 
consumption has lagged behind, accounting for a smaller share of GDP.171  From 2003 to 2010, 
investment “accounted for 53 percent of China’s economic growth, an exceptionally high share 
by international standards.”172  Additionally, the growth of net exports of goods and services 
became a major source of economic growth for China from 2005 to 2008.173  In 2004, China’s 
net exports of goods and services amounted to $40 billion or 2.5% of GDP.174  By 2007, China’s 
net exports of goods and services had more than quadrupled, reaching $235 billion or 8.8% of 
GDP.175  While investment and the net exports of goods and services have seen significant 
growth, China’s consumption share of GDP has steadily decreased.176  Throughout the 1980s, 
household consumption was, on average, slightly more than half of China’s GDP.177  In the 
1990s, household consumption dropped marginally to an average of just under half of China’s 
GDP.178  However, beginning in 2003, household consumption decreased considerably, 
accounting for only thirty five percent of GDP in 2008 and 2009.179  China’s household 
consumption share of only thirty five percent is substantially lower than any other major 
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economy in the world.180  China’s extraordinary low share of household consumption in GDP 
has caused its economy to become imbalanced, relying too heavily on investments and net 
exports.181 
 Despite China experiencing rapid urbanization since the 1990s and migrant workers 
significantly improving their income,182 China’s consumption share of GDP continues to 
decrease causing the economy to be increasingly imbalanced.183  Migrant workers have a strong 
precautionary savings motivation because they do not have access to the same basic public 
services received by local urban hukou holders.184  As a result, migrant workers have a 
substantially higher savings rate than China’s national average.185  In 2007, local urban hukou 
holders in Guangzhou had an average household savings rate of 15.6 percent, while the average 
household savings rate for rural migrant workers in Guangzhou was 41 percent.186  Since migrant 
workers save at much higher rate than the local urban hukou holders, their consumption does not 
increase with their increase in income from migrating.187 
One option to rebalance China’s economy is to increase government consumption 
expenditures, such as outlays for health, education, welfare and pensions.188  Increasing 
government consumption expenditures will increase both government consumption and 
household consumption.189  Increasing government outlays for health, education, welfare, and 
pensions will reduce the migrant workers need for precautionary savings, and as a result, the 
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migrant workers will have more disposable income and will be able to spend more, increasing 
household consumption.190  Reforming the hukou system to provide migrant workers with basic 
public services will increase government consumption expenditures and increase the household 
consumption of migrant workers by reducing their need for precautionary savings. 
 There are approximately 261 million migrant workers in China191 who are denied access 
to basic public services–such as health care insurance, pensions, unemployment benefits, and 
urban public education–because of the hukou system.192  Since most migrant workers are trapped 
working low-end jobs and receive no public services from the government, they often face bare 
minimum living standards.193  If they have any money left after purchasing the necessities to 
live, most migrant workers need to save their money in case they become unemployed, need to 
pay for any unexpected medical expenses, or have to send their children to school in the city.  If 
China reformed the hukou system allowing migrant workers to receive public services, they will 
not be motivated to save as much and will have more disposable income.  Hukou reform will 
reduce precautionary savings for migrant workers, and their household consumption will likely 
increase.  Consequently, hukou reform will also increase government consumption because the 
government will be spending more by providing basic public services to the migrant workers.  
An increase in both household consumption of the migrant workers and government 
consumption will increase China’s extremely low consumption share of GDP.  Hukou reform 
will advance the Chinese government’s self-interest of rebalancing the economy, which is 
imperative for China to sustain long term economic growth.    
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INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY 
 China desires to be a “responsible great power” in the international community and to be 
“accepted as a key global actor that is a force for peace and stability.”194  In fact, Chinese leaders 
have not hesitated to declare China as a “responsible great power.”195  In 2014, China’s foreign 
minister, Wang Yi, stated that “China will give full play to the country’s role as a responsible 
world power.”196  Since the mid-1990s, China has become increasingly involved in the 
international community by participating more in international organizations197 and multilateral 
treaties.198  As China developed into a global economy, the Chinese government realized that it 
has a growing interest in global stability because instability abroad affects China.199  China will 
continue to increase its role in the international community as a “responsible great power.”200 
Before his first visits to Russian and Africa, China’s Premier Xi Jinping declared that “as 
[China’s] strength increases, it will assume more international responsibilities.”201  
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 If China wants to be considered a “responsible great power,” it must improve its domestic 
human rights policies and cannot continue to violate international legal standards.202  “Domestic 
behavior and international credibility cannot be readily separated or neatly quarantined one from 
the other.  It will be difficult for Beijing to be accepted as a responsible stakeholder . . . as long 
as political and civil freedoms are severely restricted in China.”203  Reforming the hukou system 
will improve human rights in China and allow China to comply with international legal 
standards.  
China’s hukou system violates human rights and international treaties, specifically the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 (“ICESCR”), the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,204 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights of 1996 (“ICCPR”).205  As of March 27, 2001, China has both signed and ratified the 
ICESCR.206  China’s hukou system violates article two of the ICESR–“declaring that the rights 
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind” 207– 
because it discriminates against migrant workers on the basis of their hukou status.208  China’s 
                                                 
202 See Bates Gill, China Becoming a Responsible Stakeholder, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE 6-7 (June 11, 2007), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Bates_paper.pdf; see also YOUNG, 
supra note 1, at 58. 
203 Gill, supra note 202, at 6-7. 
204 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, and 
Vice-Chairman Peng Chung Chang of China was one of the nine drafters.  The United Nations, History of the 
Document, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2014) [hereinafter THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS]. 
205 Cf. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 58; Cf. FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND MOVEMENT, supra note 53.  
206 See SONYA SCEATS, CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 34 (Chatham House, 
2012), available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Law/r1012_  
sceatsbreslin.pdf. 
207 OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGTHS (1966), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ 
CESCR.aspx. 
208 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, supra note 58, at 3. 
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hukou system discriminates against migrant workers’ rights to freely choose work,209 social 
security,210 and an adequate standard of living211 protected under the ICESCR.212  The hukou 
system discriminates between migrant workers’ and local urban hukou holders’ rights to freely 
choose work because migrant workers are often limited to working only the worst jobs in the 
city, while urban hukou holders have access to the higher paying jobs.213  Additionally, since 
migrant workers are limited to the worst jobs, they often are subjected to bare minimum 
standards of living because of their hukou status.214  The hukou system also discriminates against 
migrant workers’ right to social security because it denies them access to health care insurance, 
pension or retirement benefits, unemployment compensation, minimum living support, and 
housing benefits.215   
In addition to violating the ICESCR, China’s hukou system also violates the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR.  China is a Security Council member of the United 
Nations–the international organization responsible for the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights–and has signed, but not yet ratified, the ICCPR.216  Both the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the ICCPR protect the rights to freedom of movement and residence within 
                                                 
209 “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which includes the right of 
everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate 
steps to safeguard this right.”  OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 207. 
210 “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including 
social insurance.”  Id. 
211 “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of 
living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement 
of living conditions.”  Id. 
212 See id (potentially violates more rights protected under the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights). 
213 See Chan, supra note 2, at 359; see also supra Part II. 
214 See id. 
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the territory of each country.217  Although China’s hukou system does not strictly control 
mobility anymore, it still sufficiently restricts the rights to freedom of movement and residence 
because of the great discrimination citizens face if they migrate from their hukou location. 
Hukou reform will further China’s goal of being accepted as a “great responsible power” 
in the international community.  China will gain international legitimacy by reforming the hukou 
system because it will improve human rights in China.  Furthermore, China will gain 
international legitimacy because it will no longer violate the ICESCR, the ICCPR, and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights because of the hukou system.  The Chinese 
government’s self-interests of gaining international legitimacy and becoming a “great 
responsible power” will be advanced by hukou reform.  
DOMESTIC SOCIAL STABILITY 
China’s domestic social stability and the increasing social unrest is a very serious concern 
of the Chinese government.218  China’s leaders often candidly publicize their concerns about the 
importance to maintain domestic social stability.219  In 2005, a Chinese government official from 
the Ministry of Public Security declared that “it should be observed that China’s current overall 
level of stability has been achieved within a high-pressure environment of unceasing, tough 
                                                 
217 See THE UNITED NATIONS, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1948), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml; see also OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGTHS (1966), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx. 
218 See CARL MINZER, SOCIAL INSTABILITY IN CHINA: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND IMPLICATIONS (Center 
for Strategic & International Studies, 2005), available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/events/061205_mizner_ 
abstract.pdf. 
219 See JOHN KNIGHT , THE ECONOMIC CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL INSTABILITY IN CHINA 2 
(University of Oxford, 2012) (claiming that the term “social instability” appeared approximately “700-800 times a 
year over the previous decade in the People’s Daily, a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mouthpiece”); see also 
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public security measures [yanda], and that the foundation of social order is relatively fragile.”220  
Also, in 2005, the “Central Party Committee and State Council leaders issued an internal 
directive that made reducing the level of social unrest a major policy goal.”221  Despite this 
concern, the number of “mass incidents,”222 continues to drastically increase in China.223  The 
number of incidents has increased from 87,000 in 2005 to more than 280,000 in 2009.224  
Additionally, according to the Ministry of Finance, China’s local and national governments’ 
expenses for public security also continue to increase.225  China’s governments spent 
approximately 405 billion yuan in 2008 and 624 billion yuan in 2011 for public security.226  The 
yearly increases in “mass incidents” and government expenditure for public security indicate that 
domestic social stability is a mounting concern of the Chinese government. 
Domestic social instability could potentially be a threat to both political order and the 
economy in China.227  In order to pose a serious threat, the social instability would need to be 
better coordinated and more widespread because generally, protests are uncoordinated and 
involve only local issues.228  However, social instability could threaten political order and the 
economy if a protest, similar to the Tiananmen Square incident,229 occurred. 230 After the 
Tiananmen Square incident, China’s GDP slowed considerably to only four percent in 1989 and 
                                                 
220 MINZER, supra note 218.  
221 Id. 
222 “Mass incidents” are social resistance movements that include riots, strikes, demonstrations, and 
protests.  See id. 
223 He Qinglian, The Huge Cost of “Stability Maintenance”, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA (Nov. 30, 2013), 
http://www.hrichina.org/en/crf/article/6415. 
224 See id. 
225 See id. 
226 See id. 
227 See KNIGHT , supra note 219, at 2. 
228 See id. at 20 
229 In 1989, about a million demonstrators gathered in Tiananmen Square to protest against corruption and 
for democratic reform.  The protest lasted for seven weeks, until China’s government launched a military offensive 
to stop the social unrest.  Tragically, many people were killed and injured during the incident.  1989: Massacre in 
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2496277.stm (last visited April 24, 2014).  
230 See KNIGHT , supra note 219, at 20. 
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1990, before returning to its normal high rate in 1991.231  Large protests continue to occur in 
China.  For instance, in April 2014, 30,000 factory employees–mostly migrant workers–went on 
strike outside of their work complex, where Nike and Adidas shoes are manufactured.232  The 
protest over unfair pay and benefits has been ongoing for almost two weeks, and in response, 
Chinese authorities have deployed riot police to maintain order.233  Despite social instability 
increasing in China, there has not been an organized protest as significant as the Tiananmen 
Square incident.                 
 Domestic social instability in China is caused by the Chinese citizens’ discontent with 
issues concerning “the ongoing economic transitions, weak legal protections for citizen rights, 
and a limited social security net for the poor and disadvantaged.”234  Income, inequality, and 
insecurity are some of the economic sources of social instability and are also some of the major 
problems of migrant workers in China.235  Additionally, the increasing social discontent of 
migrant workers is evident by the increase in mass labor disputes concerning low wages, unpaid 
back wages, and inadequate retirement benefits.236  In 1994, 52,637 workers were involved in 
such disputes, compared to the 515,000 workers in 2003.237  Migrant workers potentially pose a 
threat to China’s domestic social stability.     
Chinese citizens earning low incomes with little chance for economic growth are more 
likely to be unhappy and dissatisfied with life and therefore, also more likely to be socially 
                                                 
231 See id. 
232 See Jonathan Kaiman, Strike Spreads at Chinese Supplier to Adidas and Nike , THE GUARDIAN (April 22, 
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discontent.238  Migrant workers are usually limited to the lowest paying jobs in the cities and 
often restrained from upward economic mobility because of discrimination from their hukou 
status.  Thus, migrant workers with low incomes are more likely to be socially discontent than 
the more fortunate local urban hukou holders.  Migrant workers with more social discontent are 
more likely to threaten domestic social stability.239     
Inequality is another source of social instability.240  As discussed previously, one of 
China’s main problems is its extremely large urban-rural inequality gap.241  Chinese citizens are 
generally adverse to “inequality based on unfairness in access to opportunities.”242  However, 
economic inequality in regards to social discontent is a more localized issue243 because people 
compare their economic situations to local reference groups.244  Chinese citizens, who perceive 
themselves as economically unequal within their reference groups because of unfair access to 
opportunities, are more likely to be unhappy and dissatisfied.245  Therefore, these Chinese 
citizens are also more likely to be socially discontent.246  The hukou system limits the migrant 
workers’ access to opportunities, which is the exact type of inequality that upsets Chinese 
citizens.   Additionally, migrant workers are most affected by perceived economic inequality 
because they face economic and social discrimination from their hukou status, and their reference 
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groups are people living in the cities, including the more fortunate local urban hukou holders.247   
“[The hukou] problem has exacerbated economic inequality, a phenomenon that, if left untreated, 
threatens China’s social stability.”248   
 The lack of a social safety net or economic insecurity also threatens domestic social 
stability in China.249  Chinese citizens’ life satisfaction correlates with their economic security.250  
“The low point in life satisfaction matches the high point in unemployment and in people’s sense 
of insecurity.”251   Migrant workers are economically insecure because they lack access to a 
social safety net.  Migrant workers are denied access to receive health care insurance, pension or 
retirement benefits, unemployment compensation, minimum living support, housing benefits, 
and publicly funded education to urban schools for their children because of the hukou system.252  
The lack of a social safety net for migrant workers increases the threat to domestic social 
stability. 
 Weak legal protections for citizens’ rights in China cause domestic social instability.253  
Labor disputes, which primarily involve the rights of migrant workers, are becoming “more 
likely to have an impact on public opinion and social stability.”254  The rise in labor disputes in 
China can be linked “not only to prevailing low wages, but also to failure of government 
supervisory institutions to enforce relevant regulations and to the absence of independent unions 
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to safeguard worker rights.”255  Migrant workers’ rights are easily exploitable because many of 
them lack access to legal protection.256  Migrant workers’ rights are extremely under protected 
and cause domestic social instability.  
 Reforming the hukou system will advance China’s government’s self-interest of domestic 
social stability.  Hukou reform will allow migrant workers to receive equal access to 
opportunities, and as a result, migrant workers’ general perception of inequality will diminish.  
Also, hukou reform will allow migrant workers to receive health care insurance, pension or 
retirement benefits, unemployment compensation, minimum living support, housing benefits, 
and publicly funded education to urban schools for their children, so they will be more 
economically secure and actually have some form of a social safety net.257  Additionally, migrant 
workers will only become eligible for higher paying jobs and will no longer be as easily 
exploitable until after the hukou system is reformed.  Hukou reform will lower the threat of 
domestic social instability because it will reduce the inequality between migrant workers and 
local urban hukou holders, provide migrant workers with a social safety net, and eventually, 
increase their incomes and legal protections. 
CONCLUSION 
China’s hukou system must be reformed.  If it is not reformed by the year 2020, 
approximately 600 million citizens will be living in Chinese cities facing economic, social, and 
political discrimination.258  However, China’s government will only reform the hukou system if 
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it advances its self-interests.  The hukou system limits urbanization, increases the imbalance in 
the economy, diminishes international legitimacy, and causes domestic social instability.  Hukou 
reform will advance the Chinese government’s self-interests of accelerating urbanization, 
rebalancing the economy, gaining international legitimacy, and securing domestic social 
stability.  China’s government will eventually reform the hukou system because it will advance 
these self-interests. 
